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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE 50 - JUDGMENTS GENERALLY
CPLR 5004: Amendment of the legal rate of interest applied pro-
spectively.
Prior to 1968, the CPLR provided for interest upon judgment,123
verdict124 or accrual of an action 125 at the legal rate of six percent, as
stated in General Obligations Law § 5-501. In 1968 that statute was
amended to confer upon the Banking Board the power to prescribe
the legal rate of interest at from five percent to seven and one-half
percent per annum.126 The Board subsequently raised the rate to the
maximum permitted by statute.12 7 Confusion as to what, if any, effect
a change by the Board was meant to have on litigation-related interest
was laid to rest by the amendment to CPLR 5004, effective September
1, 1972, providing a fixed rate of six percent, independent of the pro-
visions of § 5-501.
In Yamamoto v. Costello,12 8 the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
considered the question of whether the new six percent rate should
apply retroactively to a recorded verdict which had not been reduced
to judgment, or whether the computation should be made in accord-
ance with the effective date of the amendment. In following the latter
approach, the court relied on a decision by the Appellate Division,
First Department, involving the 1968 amendment to § 5-501. In that
case, Rachlin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc.,'129 the rate of interest upon the
accrual of the cause of action was held to be controlled by the figure
fixed by the statute in effect during the period in question.
Rachlin did not address itself directly to the retroactivity issue;
the question was whether the new rates should affect the unsatisfied
obligation at all, even prospectively. The court determined that an in-
crease in the legal rate should be applied to the debt as of the effective
date of the amendment, reasoning that to allow interest lower than the
legal rate to remain with the debt would encourage debtors to delay
payment, knowing that they would receive a higher return on the
open market. The Yamamoto facts varied to the extent that the new
123 CPLR 5003.
124 CPLR 5002.
125 CPLR 5001(a).
126 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(l) (McKinney 1972) and N.Y. BANKING LAW §
14-a(2)(a)(1) (McKinney 1971). See also discussion in Rachuin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc., 33
App. Div. 2d 370, 374-75, 308 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157-58 (Ist Dep't 1970), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 145, 163 (1970).
127 See 3 NYCRR 4.1 (1969).
128 73 Misc. 2d 592, 342 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
129 33 App. Div. 2d 370, 308 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1970).
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rate was lower, not higher, than the one previously appended to the
verdict. But Judge Harnett in the instant case deemed Rachlin to be
authority for fragmenting the interest periods according to the effec-
tive date of the amendment, and thus applied the new CPLR 5004
prospectively. The court also relied on the presumption of prospective
construction 30 and on prior case law sustaining fragmentation of time
periods for interest purposes in other contexts. 31 The holding was
further supported by policy considerations, for, as correctly noted by
the court, "retroactive imposition of the six percent rate as a substitute
for the prior seven and one-half figure would bring a windfall to
the judgment debtor who has delayed satisfying his outstanding
obligations."'132
Although the amendment to CPLR 5004 is silent as to unsatisfied
judgments entered prior to its effective date, or as to actions accruing
theretofore, the Rachlin holding was seen as a barometer for future
First Department action. 33 It is hoped that the Yamamoto court's
utilization of this method of fragmenting time periods for interest
purposes will encourage other courts to follow the same approach when
confronted with this issue.
ARTICLE 52 - ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5236: Purchase of judgment by professional collector for pur-
poses of execution on real property held permissible.
By enacting CPLR 5286, the Legislature eliminated the equity of
redemption in execution sales, which was designed to ensure a fair
sale price 134 and to give the judgment debtor an opportunity to raise
130 73 Misc. 2d at 595, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 37, citing Mulligan v. Murphy, 14 N.Y.2d 223,
199 N.E.2d 496, 250 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1964); Graziano v. Donohue, 33 App. Div. 2d 578, 304
N.Y.S.2d 121 (3d Dep't 1969), aff'd mem., 25 N.Y.2d 955, 252 N.E.2d 852, 305 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1969).
13173 Misc. 2d at 595, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 37, citing City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement
Co., Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 24, 311 N.YS.2d 98 (4th Dep't 1970); Stull v. Joseph Feld, Inc.,
34 App. Div. 2d 655, 309 N.Y.S.2d 985 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.). See also O'Brien v. Young,
95 N.Y. 428 (1884); Rachlin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 370, 308 N.Y.S.2d 153
(1st Dep't 1970).
132 73 Misc. 2d at 596, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 38, citing Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank v. Sexton,
284 N.Y. 57,29 N.E.2d 469 (1940).
1335 WK&M 5004.01:
In the First Department it would seem that the determination in Rachlin would
prevail and interest will be computed at the various rates in effect during the
periods in which interest properly could be charged. In the remaining Depart-
ments the question of what are the applicable rates for periods prior to September
1, 1972 may yet have to be determined.
134 Paradoxically, the [redemption] provisions have probably had an exactly op-
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